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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                             
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 I.  INTRODUCTION 
  Thomas James Cleary ("Cleary") appeals from an order of 
the district court entered on May 24, 1994, denying Cleary's 
motion to vacate or correct an illegal sentence pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2255.  Cleary asserts that the district court violated 
Rule 11(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by 
failing, at his change of plea hearing, to adequately inform him 
and determine that he understood the maximum penalty he could 
receive.  In particular, Cleary contends that the court erred by 
failing to explain the effects of a term of special parole.  
Because of the court's alleged error, Cleary seeks a reduction of 
his special parole term from ten years to two, or, in the 
alternative, a vacatur of his guilty plea.  For the reasons 
stated herein, we find that the district court's error did not 
rise to the level required to permit collateral relief under 
section 2255. 
 II.  BACKGROUND AND FACTS 
  On September 8, 1982, a grand jury sitting in the 
Western District of Pennsylvania returned a two count indictment 
against Cleary, charging him with:  (1) Count One - conspiracy to 
  
violate federal narcotics laws in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; 
and (2) Count Two - manufacturing and distributing 
methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 
U.S.C. § 2.  On December 7, 1982, pursuant to an oral plea 
agreement, Cleary pled guilty to Count Two of the indictment.  In 
exchange, the Government agreed to dismiss Count One of the 
indictment.  On January 10, 1983, the district court judge 
sentenced Cleary to three years imprisonment to be followed by a 
special parole term of ten years on Count Two.  Count One was 
dismissed.  Cleary appealed his sentence, but because he became a 
fugitive pending appeal, this Court dismissed his appeal.  See 
United States v. Cleary, No. 83-5044 (3d Cir. June 6, 1983).  
  On June 24, 1985, Cleary filed his first habeas motion 
to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2255.  Acting pro se, Cleary advanced several arguments 
in support of his motion, including:  (1) the presentence 
investigation report was factually inaccurate;1 (2) the 
government illegally searched his car without a warrant and 
illegally seized money therefrom; (3) the prosecution withheld 
information favorable to the defense; and (4) the district court 
denied him the opportunity to present evidence on his behalf.  
                     
 
   1  Specifically, Cleary claimed that the presentence 
investigation report erroneously stated that he had filed for 
bankruptcy, when he did no such thing; that he had loaned his 
father $12,000, when in actuality his father had loaned him that 
amount of money; and that he had 35,750 dosage units of 
methamphetamine, when he really had only 2,405 dosage units.  
  
The court appointed counsel for Cleary and, with the assistance 
of that counsel, Cleary amended his habeas motion to allege that 
the district court had violated Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 32 by failing to:  (1) determine whether or not the 
defendant and his counsel had an opportunity to read and discuss 
the presentence report; (2) afford counsel an opportunity to 
speak on behalf of the defendant prior to the imposition of 
sentence; and (3) address the defendant personally and ask him if 
he wished to make a statement on his own behalf and present 
information in mitigation of punishment.   
  By order dated January 17, 1986, the district court 
denied Cleary's motion.  Cleary appealed, and on August 19, 1986, 
this Court affirmed the decision of the district court.  See 
United States v. Cleary, Nos. 86-3083 and 86-3097 (3d Cir. August 
19, 1986).  Cleary subsequently petitioned the United States 
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was denied on 
November 3, 1986.  
  Cleary was released from prison on February 2, 1987, 
after serving his original three year sentence plus an additional 
year on an escape charge.  He began serving his special parole 
term on January 14, 1989, after finishing a term of regular 
parole, and was to remain on special parole for ten years, until 
January 13, 1999.  Supplemental Appendix ("S. App.") 9.  However, 
on April 15, 1993, the United States Parole Commission ("Parole 
Commission") revoked Cleary's special parole term because Cleary, 
  
while on special parole, had been indicted for:  (1) conspiracy 
to manufacture methamphetamine; (2) possession of methamphetamine 
for sale; and (3) manufacture of methamphetamine.  S. App. 2.  In 
addition, Cleary had been charged with reckless driving and 
associating with a person engaged in criminal activity.  Id.  The 
Parole Commission directed that Cleary was to be imprisoned until 
the expiration of his ten-year special parole term without credit 
for the time that he had already spent on special parole.  Id.  
Cleary appealed the decision of the Parole Commission.  The 
Commission, however, affirmed its prior decision.   
  On January 12, 1994, Cleary filed the present motion to 
correct or vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  In 
this motion, Cleary asserts that his sentence is illegal and 
should be reduced or vacated because at his change of plea 
hearing the district court failed to properly explain to him the 
effects of special parole as required by Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11(c)(1).  The following exchange, at Cleary's change 
of plea hearing on December 7, 1982, is central to his present 
allegations: 
 ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY ("AUSA"):  . . .  The 
penalty is five years and/or $15,000, with a special 
parole term of two years. 
 
 COURT:  All right.  Now, that means by entering this 
guilty plea you could be sentenced to prison for up to 
five years and/or fined up to $15,000.  And if the 
Judge decides that you are to go to jail for any period 
of time, he must also place you on special parole for a 
minimum of two years and for whatever maximum period 
the Judge believes to be appropriate.  That means if I 
decide to send you to jail for any period of time, when 
you are released from that institution you will be on a 
  
special parole term of at least two years and for 
whatever maximum I think is appropriate.  And you will 
be supervised by people such as this man seated in the 
jury box who works for the Probation Office, and you 
will be required to adhere to certain rather stringent 
requirements:  That is, to stay out of difficulty with 
the law; your right to own a weapon is abrogated 
without permission otherwise; and certain reporting 
requirements to a probation officer.  Do you understand 
that? 
 
 CLEARY:  Yes, I do.  
App. 16. 
  In particular, Cleary alleges that the AUSA's statement 
regarding the penalty misled Cleary into believing that "the 
special parole term was with the five (5) year penalty."  
Cleary's Opening Brief at 5.  We interpret Cleary's argument to 
mean that he believed that the special parole term was included 
within, the five year maximum length of imprisonment.  Cleary 
further asserts that the district court's statements after the 
AUSA's comment did not dispel his mistaken belief.  In addition, 
Cleary claims that the district court failed to explain that:  
his special parole term would begin only after he had finished 
his regular parole and that he could end up serving more than the 
five-year maximum sentence revealed to him at his change of plea 
hearing because, if he were to violate his special parole, he 
could be imprisoned for the entire length of the special parole 
term, without any credit for the time he had already spent on 
special parole.  
  After receiving the government's response to Cleary's 
motion, the district court, on March 31, 1994, denied that motion 
  
without explanation.  Cleary filed additional documents with the 
district court in support of his motion, including:  (1) an 
affidavit stating that he would not have pled guilty if he had 
been adequately instructed on the nature and possible 
consequences of special parole, on April 14, 1994 (App. 9-10); 
(2) a supplemental memorandum, on April 18, 1994; (3) a motion 
for reconsideration, on May 6, 1994; and (4) an addendum to the 
motion for reconsideration, on May 24, 1994.   
  On May 24, 1994, the district court denied Cleary's 
motion to reconsider, finding that:  "(1) the court explained the 
provisions of special parole in complete and adequate terms 
during the guilty plea colloquy; (2) the contentions of 
petitioner are foreclosed by the holding of United States v. 
Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780 (1979); and (3) the petitioner has failed 
to exhaust administrative remedies."  Appendix ("App.") 2 
(citation omitted).  Cleary filed the instant appeal on May 29, 
1994. 
 III.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
  The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
2255.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  The decision whether to grant or deny a habeas corpus 
petition is reviewed de novo.  See United States v. DeLuca, 889 
F.2d 503, 505-508 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 IV.  DISCUSSION 
  
  Rule 11(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
requires that before a district court may accept a guilty plea, 
the court must "inform the defendant of, and determine that the 
defendant understands," a laundry list of information regarding 
the defendant's rights and the consequences of his or her plea.  
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c).  In particular, Rule 11(c)(1) requires 
the court to inform the defendant of, and make sure he or she 
understands, "the maximum possible penalty provided by law, 
including the effect of any special parole or supervised release 
term."2  The Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules regarding 
the 1982 amendment of Rule 11(c)(1) recommends that a judge 
inform the defendant, and determine that he or she understands, 
the four following items in a case involving special parole or 
supervised release: 
 (1) that a special parole term will be added to any 
prison sentence he [or she] receives; 
 (2) the minimum length of the special parole term that 
must be imposed and the absence of a statutory maximum; 
 (3) that special parole is entirely different from -- 
and in addition to -- ordinary parole; and 
 (4) that if the special parole is violated, the 
defendant can be returned to prison for the remainder 
of his [or her] sentence and the full length of his [or 
her] special parole term. 
                     
    
2
  At the time of Cleary's guilty plea, Rule 11(c)(1) 
required the court to advise the defendant of "the effect of any 
special parole term."  The Rule was subsequently amended in 1989 
to include supervised release. 
  
1982 Amendment Advisory Committee Note, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1) 
(quoting Moore v. United States, 592 F.2d 753, 755 (4th Cir. 
1979)).   
  In the present case, Cleary asserts that the court 
presiding over his change of plea hearing violated Rule 11(c)(1).  
We agree in that the district court failed to explain to Cleary 
the effects of special parole, including the consequences of a 
violation, and that special parole is different from and in 
addition to regular parole.  United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 
1030, 1037 n.18 (3d Cir. 1982) ("Rule 11 explicitly requires that 
courts explain any `special parole' consequences . . . because 
they are cumulative to any prison term imposed, and therefore 
effectively expand the maximum possible sentence for the 
offense."); see also United States v. Osment, 13 F.3d 1240, 1242 
(8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Tuangmaneeratmun, 925 F.2d 797, 
803 (5th Cir. 1991). 
  Because the district court violated Rule 11 in failing 
to make an adequate explanation, we must determine whether this 
violation rises to a level that would justify a collateral attack 
on the judgment of conviction.  It is well established that "to 
obtain collateral relief a prisoner must clear a significantly 
higher hurdle than would exist on direct appeal."3  United States 
                     
    
3
  Accordingly, the cases cited by the parties regarding 
relief for Rule 11 violations on direct appeal, while instructive 
as to what constitutes a Rule 11 violation, are not on point 
regarding whether habeas relief for such a violation is 
appropriate. 
  
v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982).  Because of the great 
interest in finality of judgments, an error which may "justify 
reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a 
collateral attack on a final judgment."  United States v. 
Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 (1979); Frady, 456 U.S. at 164.  
Indeed, "the concern with finality served by the limitation on 
collateral attack has special force with respect to convictions 
based on guilty pleas."  Timmreck, 441 U.S. at 784 (footnote 
omitted).  This is because "'the concern that unfair procedures 
may have resulted in the conviction of an innocent defendant is 
only rarely raised by a petition to set aside a guilty plea.'"  
Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d 521, 528-29 (7th 
Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).   
  To be entitled to habeas corpus relief under section 
2255, Cleary must show that the Rule 11 error amounted to "a 
fundamental defect which inherently result[ed] in a complete 
miscarriage of justice or an omission inconsistent with the 
rudimentary demands of fair procedure."  United States v. DeLuca, 
889 F.2d 503, 506 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 939 
(1990).  Not only must Cleary demonstrate an error of 
constitutional magnitude, but he also must show that he was 
prejudiced by that error, i.e., that he did not understand the 
consequences of his plea or that, if he had been properly advised 
about the effect of special parole, he would not have pled 
guilty.  See Lucas v. United States, 963 F.2d 8, 13 (2d Cir.), 
  
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 270 (1992).  We find that the district 
court's Rule 11 violation did not rise to that level.   
  In United States v. Timmreck, the Supreme Court made it 
clear that "'collateral relief is not available when all that is 
shown is a failure to comply with the formal requirements of'" 
Rule 11.  Id. at 785 (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 
424, 429 (1962)).  This Court, in United States v. DeLuca, 889 
F.2d at 507, went beyond Timmreck to hold that "a petitioner who 
has been advised of the possibility of a given sentence but 
receives instead a sentence of equal or less time in which 
special parole time is substituted for prison time has not 
alleged a fundamental defect resulting in a complete miscarriage 
of justice as is required to sustain a habeas action."4   
  The most factually similar case to the present case, 
however, is the Second Circuit's Lucas, 963 F.2d 8.  In Lucas, 
the defendant, Lucas, brought a section 2255 habeas motion to 
have his judgment of conviction vacated, based on the district 
court's failure to inform him of the maximum possible penalty 
during his guilty plea.  Although the court had advised Lucas of 
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  This case is distinguishable from DeLuca in one extremely 
important respect:  the district court advised Cleary that he 
faced a mandatory term of special parole whereas the district 
court in DeLuca completely failed to mention the possibility of a 
term of special parole. Indeed, in the present case the district 
court advised Cleary that the special parole term would be in 
addition to his term of imprisonment and could range from a 
minimum of two years to "whatever maximum" the court deemed 
appropriate.  Thus, we are not faced with a total failure to 
advise of a special parole term, as in DeLuca.  
  
a five-year maximum term of imprisonment, it failed to explain 
that Lucas was also subject to a $15,000 fine and a mandatory 
two-year term of special parole.  At sentencing, Lucas received 
four years of imprisonment, a two-year term of special parole, 
and a fine of $10,000.  Id. at 10.  In his habeas motion, Lucas 
asserted that he would not have pled guilty if he had been 
properly advised about the maximum possible penalty.  The 
district court found that Lucas had suffered a constitutional 
violation entitling him to collateral relief.  Instead of 
vacating his conviction, however, the court excised the parts of 
Lucas' sentence which offended Rule 11 -- the special parole term 
and the fine.  Both Lucas and the Government appealed.   
  The Second Circuit found that the district court had 
violated Rule 11(c)(1) by failing to fully advise Lucas, at his 
change of plea hearing, of the maximum possible penalty for the 
crime of conviction.  However, it determined that Lucas should 
not be granted collateral relief:  
 because he acknowledged that he had reviewed the 
presentence report before sentencing, a report that 
contained the maximum penalties he faced, including the 
fine and special parole term; because he failed to 
object to the sentence; because he failed to attempt to 
withdraw his plea at sentencing, even when invited by 
the judge to speak; because he failed to pursue a 
direct appeal on the issue; because he failed to raise 
the issue in timely motions and because he failed to 
demonstrate any other prejudice. 
Id. at 15; see also United States v. Carey, 884 F.2d 547, 549 
(11th Cir. 1989) (court's failure to advise defendant of 
mandatory term of supervised release at guilty plea was harmless 
  
error where defendant was informed of supervised release in 
presentence report and at sentencing and neither defendant nor 
his counsel objected), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1067 (1990). 
  As in Lucas, Cleary is not entitled to collateral 
relief because the record supports the conclusion that Cleary was 
not prejudiced by the court's failure to explain the effects of 
special parole and that no manifest injustice or unfair procedure 
occurred here.  At the change of plea hearing, the district court 
instructed Cleary that:   
 [B]y entering this guilty plea you could be sentenced 
to prison for up to five years and/or fined up to 
$15,000.  And if the Judge decides that you are to go 
to jail for any period of time, he must also place you 
on special parole for a minimum of two years and for 
whatever maximum period the Judge believes to be 
appropriate.  That means if I decide to send you to 
jail for any period of time, when you are released from 
that institution you will be on a special parole term 
of at least two years and for whatever maximum I think 
is appropriate. 
App. 16 (emphasis added).  We think that these instructions are 
sufficient to advise a reasonable person that Cleary's special 
parole term would begin only after he successfully completed his 
prison sentence of up to five years, and that the term of special 
parole could be imposed in excess of the statutory maximum term 
of imprisonment for the offense (five years in his case).  We 
also note that Cleary stated that he understood the penalties 
explained by the court and did not ask any questions or make any 
statements that would lead us to believe that he did not fully 
  
understand the consequences of his guilty plea.5  Furthermore, at 
the end of the colloquy, the court asked all of the parties 
whether it had overlooked anything.  Tr. 53, 56.  Cleary did not 
ask about special parole or its effects, and neither he nor his 
attorney brought up the court's failure to advise Cleary about 
the effects of special parole.  This is significant because, as 
the transcripts of the change of plea and sentencing hearings 
show, Cleary was not hesitant to voice his opinions and concerns 
to the court.   
  Additionally, as in Lucas, the fact that Cleary was 
subject to a mandatory period of special parole for a minimum of 
two years was also stated in the presentence report.  Although 
Cleary objected to presentence report in several respects, he did 
not complain about the term of special parole or raise any 
questions as to its effect.  Furthermore, neither Cleary nor his 
attorney objected to the ten-year special parole term at his 
sentencing.  In fact, his attorney requested that Cleary "be 
placed on a period of probation for the maximum period of time as 
well as the maximum [special] parole period after that.  Or in 
lieu thereof, to do a minimum amount of incarceration and 
thereafter do the complete balance of the term on probation and 
then the mandatory parole . . . ."  Sentencing Hearing Transcript 
                     
    
5
  Cleary was represented by competent counsel at his change 
of plea hearing and Cleary's intelligence and education -- he 
completed three years of college -- are more than established by 
the lucid, cogent arguments he has presented to this Court and 
the court below in his briefs.  
  
("S. Tr.") 115.  Indeed, after rendering Cleary's sentence, the 
court advised Cleary that the ten years of special parole would 
"be of no moment" if he stayed out of trouble with the law, but 
warned him that he would be sent back to jail if he committed 
another criminal act while on special parole.  S. App. 1.  
Despite the comments of the court and his attorney and an 
opportunity to address the court at his sentencing, S. Tr. 118 
and 122, Cleary did not protest the term of special parole or its 
effect.   
  Cleary also failed to challenge the district court's 
Rule 11 violation in his first habeas corpus motion.  In fact, 
Cleary raised the special parole issue for the first time only 
after the Parole Commission revoked his special parole status, 
more than twelve years after he was sentenced.  Even then, he 
waited several months before submitting his self-serving 
affidavit stating that he would not have pled guilty if he had 
known about the effects of special parole.  In light of the 
record and Cleary's failure to take action with respect to this 
claim, his affidavit is unconvincing.  Thus, he cannot show that 
he was prejudiced by the court's violation.  Moreover, we cannot 
find that the district court's error resulted in a fundamental 
defect which resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice or an 
omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair 
procedure.   
 V.  CONCLUSION 
  
  Accordingly, the district court's denial of Cleary's  
motion to vacate his guilty plea is affirmed. 
 
